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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j) (1996) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the priority status of the Medicaid 
hen is valid under federal and state law? 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the co-defendant law firm Robert B. 
Sykes and Associates is not entitled to attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) 
because it failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7? 
1 
3. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the issue of Streight's 
noncooperation in identifying liable third parties is immaterial because Streight and the 
law firm failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7? 
"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law\" Jackson v. Mateus, 
2003 UT 18, f 6, P.3d . Whether a trial court properly granted summary 
judgment is a question of law. Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, 
f 14, 52 P.3d 1179. The appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness and accords no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 9, 999 P.2d 572. When reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, the appellate court reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Houghton v. Dept. of 
Health, 2002 UT 101, f 2, 57 P.3d 1067 (quoting Regal Ins. Co. v. Botty 2001 UT 71, f 2, 
31P.3d524). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following relevant provisions are included in Addendum A. 
a. State Statutes: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5 (1998). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-6 (1998). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (1998). 
2 
b. State Administrative Rules: 
1. Utah Admin. Code R527-800-8 (1997). 
2. Utah Admin. Code R527-936-2 (1997). 
c. Federal Regulations: 
1. 42 C.F.R. § 433.147 (1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose when the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services ("ORS") filed 
a complaint against the Medicaid recipient Peggy Sue Streight ("Streight") and the law 
firm of Robert B. Sykes & Associates ("law firm") under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 
(1998). ORS sought reimbursement out of the third-party insurance proceeds paid to 
these defendants for $107,363.70 in Medicaid funds paid to the health care providers who 
treated Streight (R. 1-14). On May 18, 2001, the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of ORS in a Memorandum Decision and granted a money judgment against the 
defendants (R. 605). On June 11, 2002, the trial court denied defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration and entered a judgment and order incorporating its Memorandum 
Decision (R. 845). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On June 9,1998, Peggy Sue Streight was severely injured walking across the street 
in Gunnison, Utah when she was struck by a car driven by Sherilyn Christensen (R. 850). 
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On June 17, 1998, Streight's father Orval I. (Bud) Jensen applied for medical assistance 
on behalf of Streight, his adult incapacitated daughter (R. 850). On June 26, 1998, Jensen 
completed a Medicaid Third Party Insurance questionnaire identifying Sherilyn 
Christensen as the driver of the vehicle and Farmers Insurance as her insurance carrier (R. 
565, 850). This Medicaid questionnaire was part of Streight's Department of Workforce 
Services file, along with her applications for other types of assistance in addition to 
medical assistance (R. 578). The Office of Recovery Services ("ORS"), the state agency 
designated to pursue reimbursement for the Utah Department of Health's medical 
assistance programs, had no knowledge of the document until it was sent via facsimile 
from the Utah Department of Workforce Services to Carrie Worthen, an employee of 
ORS on January 15, 1999 (R. 578). 
On August 3, 1998, Jensen filed an additional application for medical assistance 
and other assistance benefits on behalf of his daughter, Streight (R. 851). This 
application contained an assignment to the Utah Department of Health (R. 230). In 
addition to the assignment, this section in the application provided that, "[i]f the Utah 
Department of Health pays for my medical care, I will give them any money I collect 
from an insurance policy. I will also give them any money I collect from someone liable 
for my medical expenses" (R. 230). Also in August 1998, Jensen retained the services of 
the defendant law firm Robert B. Sykes and Associates on behalf of Streight (R. 851). 
Jensen informed the law firm that he had applied for medical assistance on behalf of 
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Streight (R. 851). On August 25, 1998, Streight was deemed eligible for medical 
assistance retroactive to June 1, 1998 (R. 851). The Utah Medicaid program paid 
$107,363.70 to various medical care providers who treated Streight's injuries (R. 852). 
On September 17, 1998, Streight filed a petition for appointment of conservator 
and for approval of the settlement of Streight's claims against the driver Christensen, her 
insurer Utah Farm Bureau, and Streight's own underinsured motorist policy carrier Ohio 
Casualty Insurance (R. 851). At a hearing, Sixth District Judge David L. Mower entered 
an order approving the appointment of a conservator, approving the settlement and the 
execution of a release of Streight's claims, and establishing a supplemental needs trust (R. 
260, 851-852). The order approved the settlement of Streight's claims against Sherilyn 
Christensen and Utah Farm Bureau for the vehicle liability insurance policy limits of 
$100,000 and against Ohio Casualty Insurance for Streight's underinsured motorist policy 
limit of $10,000 (R. 260, 851-852). The order allowed $38,030.92 of the settlement 
funds to be paid to the Sykes law firm as attorney fees and costs (R. 263, 852). Streight's 
conservators agreed to release her claims against the driver and insurance carriers for 
payment of the insurance policy limits (R. 452). 
On September 28, 1998, five days after the hearing and court approval of the 
settlement, Jensen contacted ORS requesting a copy of the medical bills paid to that date 
on behalf of Streight (R. 852). On September 30,1998, ORS responded to the request 
and faxed a list of the medical bills paid by Medicaid (R. 852). On January 15,1999, 
5 
Carrie Worthen, an ORS employee, had a telephone conversation with Orval Jensen in 
which Jensen admitted three things (R. 362). First, he admitted that he informed the 
Sykes law firm about the Medicaid application, at which time the law firm informed him 
of a pending Medicaid reimbursement case at the Utah Supreme Court (R. 363). Second, 
he admitted that he and the law firm wanted to put the settlement proceeds into a 
supplemental needs trust before Medicaid began paying any of Streight's medical 
expenses that would be submitted by her medical care providers on the premise that 
Medicaid was entitled to reimbursement only for expenses it had actually paid before 
those third-party proceeds were placed into a supplemental needs trust (R. 109-112, 363, 
521). Finally, he admitted that when Medicaid started paying Streight's medical 
expenses, the law firm advised him that it was too much to repay, and he agreed to place 
the proceeds into the trust without paying the Medicaid lien (R. 363). 
Neither Streight, her conservators, nor attorneys requested written consent of the 
Office of Recovery Services or the Department of Health before filing or settling the 
claims with third parties (R. 363). Neither ORS nor the Department of Health was sent 
notice of the petition for approval of the settlement or the hearing on the petition (R. 452). 
The petition specifically set out that "[t]here are no other persons interested in Peggy 
Sue's estate who are entitled to notice pursuant to law, other than the natural parents and 
guardians, Bud and Karen Jensen" (R. 452). Therefore, Streight, her conservators and 
her attorneys failed to seek or obtain consent to file a claim for medical costs from the 
6 
Office of Recovery Services before settling the claims with third parties (R. 852). No 
authorized representative of the Office of Recovery Services or Department of Health 
either granted or denied consent to Streight, her conservators or her attorneys to file a 
claim for medical expenses paid by the Medicaid program (R. 578-579). 
The Utah Medicaid program was billed $176,143.22 by various medical providers 
for the treatment of Streight's injuries (R. 754, Ex. G f 30) but it paid $107,363.70 to 
satisfy those bills (R. 852). ORS demanded reimbursement for the Medicaid claim out of 
the third-party proceeds paid to Streight and the law firm (R. 852). Both defendants 
refused to pay the Medicaid claim out of the settlement proceeds (R. 852). The State filed 
the complaint in this case on November 22, 1999 (R. 85). Upon ORS's motion, the trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the State for full reimbursement of Medicaid 
payments made on behalf of Streight. The court entered judgment against Streight in the 
amount of $69,332.78 and judgment against Robert B. Sykes and Associates in the 
amount of $38,030.92, the amount the law firm was paid from the third-party proceeds. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The issue of the validity of the Medicaid claim's priority status has been resolved 
by Houghton v. Department of Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067, cert denied 538 U.S. 
, 123 S. Ct. 1632, 71 USLW 3519 (March 31, 2003). The law firm is not entitled 
to an attorney fee from ORS because it failed to comply with the requirements set out in 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (1998). The facts of the instant case do not fall within the 
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three recovery methods set out in State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 572 and 
therefore McCoy does not apply here. The Medicaid recipient in McCoy complied with 
the statutory requirements in Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7, whereas Streight and the law 
firm did not comply with section 26-19-7 because they failed to seek consent from ORS, 
failed to specifically exclude the Medicaid claim from the settlement, and settled for all 
available third-party insurance proceeds which prejudiced the Medicaid claim for 
reimbursement against the liable third parties. 
The issue of whether Streight cooperated in identifying third-party information is 
not an issue of material fact preventing summary judgment because Streight and the law 
firm failed to comply with section 26-19-7. Even if it were a material fact, Streight failed 
to satisfy the cooperation requirements set out in 42 C.F.R. § 433.147 (1998), because she 
did not provide third-party identification to the proper agency, ORS, and failed toiorward 
third-party proceeds to reimburse Medicaid. Streight's and the law firm's actions, by 
failing to comply with section 26-19-7 and to cooperate with ORS, prejudiced the 
Medicaid claim for reimbursement against the third parties. The third parties had no 
notice of the Medicaid claim at the time of settlement and ORS no longer had the right to 
proceed against the third party under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(3). At that point, ORS's 
only available method of recovery was against Streight and any other party to whom the 
proceeds were paid. Streight and the law firm are not entitled to a contribution of 
attorney fees from ORS when their unlawful acts prejudiced the Medicaid priority claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S PRIORITY CLAIM ON THIRD-PARTY PROCEEDS 
IS VALID AND DOES NOT VIOLATE FEDERAL LAW. 
Under Utah law, the Medicaid lien against proceeds paid by third parties is not a 
lien placed on the recipient's property because those proceeds do not become property of 
the recipient until after Medicaid is reimbursed. State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 10,999 
P.2d 572; S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439,442 (Utah 1998); Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 
P.2d 446,448 (Utah 1998). Since the proceeds are not the Medicaid recipient's property, 
the priority nature of the lien does not encumber the recipient's property even if the 
proceeds include payment for the nonmedical claims of the recipient. Houghton v. 
Department of Health, 2002 UT 101, f 9, 57 P.3d 1067; McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 12. Even 
though this law is now well settled, defendants have raised this issue in their brief based 
on Petitions for Certiorari pending before the U.S. Supreme Court in both Houghton and 
in Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2002), petition for cert, filed, 71 
USLW 3116 (U.S. Minn. July 19, 2002)(No. 02-117). 
The U.S. Supreme Court denied the Medicaid recipient's Petition for Certiorari in 
Houghton on March 31, 2003. Houghton, 538 U.S. , 123 S. Ct. 1632, 71 USLW 
3519 (U.S. Utah March 31, 2003)(No. 02-1102). The Petition for Certiorari in the Martin 
case is still pending but Martin is not controlling in Utah. This Court declined to abandon 
its own "well-established precedent in favor of the Martin approach." Houghton, 2002 
UT101,19n.5. 
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II. CO-DEFENDANT LAW FIRM FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 
SECTION 26-19-7 AND, THUS, IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
CONTRIBUTION OF ATTORNEY FEES FROM THE ORS. 
The law firm is not entitled to attorney fees because Streight and the firm failed to 
comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (1998). Under subsection 
26-19-7(l)(a), a Medicaid recipient "must seek the State's consent before attempting to 
recover from a third party for any medical costs paid by the State." McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 
f 14. Streight and the law firm argue that the law firm is entitled to attorney fees from 
ORS under McCoy regardless of whether or not they complied with section 26-19-7. 
However, McCoy is distinguishable from the instant case because the Medicaid recipient 
in McCoy, unlike Streight, complied with section 26-19-7. By failing to comply with 
section 26-19-7, Streight and her attorney prejudiced the Medicaid claim against the third 
party thereby foreclosing all avenues of recovery except against Streight, the Medicaid 
recipient. An award of attorney fees would reward Streight and her attorney for refusing 
to comply with section 26-19-7. 
As a condition of Medicaid eligibility, Streight assigned, by operation of law, all 
payments from third parties otherwise to or on behalf of her to the Utah Department of 
Health. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-4.5 (1998). See S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 
1998). The Medicaid recipient assigns to the State that portion of any third-party 
recovery equal to the amount of medical assistance she receives. Wallace v. Estate of 
Jackson, 972 P.2d 445,558 (Utah 1998). The assignment authorizes the Department of 
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Health to submit its claim for reimbursement up to the amount of medical assistance it has 
provided. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(l)(a) (1998). 5.5., 972 P.2d at 442. 
The Utah Department of Health must take all reasonable measures to ascertain any 
third parties who may be legally liable for medical payments which the Medicaid Program 
would otherwise pay. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (1999). The Office of Recovery 
Services ("ORS") administers the Third Party Liability Program by identifying and 
collecting these Medicaid claims for the Department of Health. ORS has adopted the 
federal regulations governing this program. Utah Admin. Code R527-936-2 (1997). 
Except for attorney fees payable under section 26-19-7, the Medicaid claim is a 
lien on all third-party proceeds and has priority, over all other claims, to the proceeds 
including the Medicaid recipient's claim. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(l)(b) (1998). The 
priority lien provides the mechanism to ensure that the State!& Medicaid program wilLbe 
fully reimbursed out of the third-party proceeds to the fullest extent possible. This lien is 
against the entire settlement proceeds, even if portions of the proceeds are designated as 
payment for something other than medical expenses. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 12. 
The Department, through ORS, also has a right to commence its own action 
against the third party for the recovery of medical assistance if the third party receives 
written notice of the Medicaid lien before settlement with the recipient or if the third 
party has actual knowledge of the medical assistance. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(3) 
(1998). ORS must provide written notice of its action to the Medicaid recipient and the 
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recipient may intervene in ORS's action at any time before trial. Utah Code Ann. § 26-
19-6(1998). 
An action commenced by ORS does not bar an action by the recipient for 
nonmedical damages. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(5) (1998). ORS has an unconditional 
right to intervene in the recipient's action. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(l)(b) (1998). 
However, this does not give the recipient a right to settle nonmedical claims without first 
complying with section 26-19-7 because a priority lien exists on those third-party 
settlement proceeds. Recoveries from third parties liable for the same expenses covered 
by Medicaid belong to the State. 5.5., 972 P.2d at 443. 
The Medicaid recipient may not file a claim or commence an action for recovery of 
medical costs of the same injury or disease for which the Department provided medical 
assistance without the written consent of the Department or ORS. Utah Coda Ann^§-26-
19-7(l)(a) (1998). Section 26-19-7 protects both the liable third party as well as the State 
"from ill-informed or devious actions by the recipient." 5.5., 972 P.2d at 441. It also 
ensures that the recipient's preemptive action does not cost the State its right to third-
party payments which are in settlement or are already in the hands of the beneficiary. Id. 
If the recipient proceeds without ORS's written consent, the Department is not bound by 
any decision, judgment or settlement, and it may recover the medical assistance it 
provided from either the recipient or from any party to whom the proceeds were made 
payable. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2)(a). "Payments made by a third party do not 
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legally become property of the recipient until after a valid settlement which necessarily 
must include reimbursement to Medicaid." S.S., 972 P.2d at 441. 
Under subsection 26-19-7(4), ORS incurs attorney fees in Medicaid 
reimbursement cases by either contributing to the cooperative Medicaid recipient's 
attorney fees or by pursuing payment using its own lawyers. Office of Recovery Services 
v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 19, 999 P.2d 572. If an attorney wishes to represent Medicaid 
recipients, he or she is legally obligated under subsection 26-19-7(4) to contact the 
Department of Health or its designee, ORS, and sign a written agreement to protect the 
State's interest in obtaining reimbursement from damages payable by third parties. 
Houghton v. Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1998). Section 26-19-7 
anticipates the payment of attorney fees to a Medicaid recipient only if the recipient 
complies with that section and does not preclude ORS from collecting the Medicaid claim 
from the third party. 
Pursuant to section 26-19-7, ORS must pay attorney fees under three different 
circumstances. First, the State may take action directly against the third party and pay its 
own attorney fees. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, <][ 19. Second, it may grant consent to the 
recipient and pay attorney fees to the recipient. Id. Third, it may refuse consent and 
pursue the recipient for a share of the proceeds and pay attorney fees to the recipient. Id. 
Under these criteria, ORS must pay the Sykes law firm only if the firm had sought 
consent and received it or sought consent and been denied. 
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McCoy ensured that ORS could not snub the recipient's attempt to follow the law 
and to cooperate with the agency. Under McCoy, if ORS refuses to give consent to the 
Medicaid recipient with the intention of pursuing the third party directly, but then chooses 
to proceed against the recipient instead of the third party, ORS must pay an attorney fee to 
the recipient. McCoy did not, as the law firm argues, require that no matter the avenue of 
recovery elected by the State, it must always pay its fair share of attorney fees to the 
recipient's attorney for recovery on a settlement procured by counsel (Aplt. Br. at 8-9). 
The recipient in McCoy did not preclude ORS's choice of recovery method and that point 
is key to the difference between McCoy and this case. 
In McCoy, the Medicaid recipient, through his attorney John McCoy, requested 
consent to pursue the Medicaid claim on behalf of ORS. McCoy, 2002 UT 39, f 3. In a 
letter to Mr. McCoy, ORS denied consent, stating that it would seek full recovery.of the 
Medicaid claim directly from the third party. Id. Mr. McCoy then provided notice to 
ORS that he would not include the Medicaid claim in the recipient's claim against the 
third party. Id. Mr. McCoy also notified the third-party insurer that he was not seeking 
to recover medical costs paid by Medicaid and expressly excluded the State's claim from 
settlement negotiations. Id. at f 5. This Court held that ORS was required to pay the 
recipient an attorney fee because ORS's actions fell under the third circumstance, i.e. 
ORS denied consent and then pursued reimbursement from the Medicaid recipient after 
settlement. Id. at f 18. This Court found that by requesting consent and then expressly 
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excluding the State's claim from settlement after denial of consent, Mr. McCoy complied 
with the requirements of the Medical Benefits Recovery Act in Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-
19-1 through -19 (1998). Id. It is this fact that distinguishes McCoy from the instant 
case. Here, unlike McCoy, the Sykes law firm and Streight failed to comply with Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 26-19-5 and -7. Unlike McCoy, the law firm failed to seek consent from 
ORS (R. 363). 
Along with failing to seek or obtain consent, defendants failed to comply with 
additional requirements. Unlike Mr. McCoy, the law firm failed to notify the Office of 
Recovery Services about the existence of third-party proceeds. Also, unlike Mr. McCoy, 
the law firm failed to notify the third party of the impending Medicaid claim. Here, 
unlike McCoy, the law firm failed to notify ORS and the third parties that it was expressly 
excluding the Medicaid claim from Streight's claim for damages. In fact, thelawJSrm 
did exactly the opposite by misleading the probate court in its petition for Appointment of 
Conservatorship by stating that "[t]here are no other persons interested in Peggy Sue's 
estate who are entitled to notice pursuant to law, other than the natural parents and 
guardians, Bud and Karen Jensen" (R. 452). 
If notice of the petition had been given to ORS as required by Utah Code Ann. §§ 
75-5-405(2) and 75-5-406, it would have prevented the State's claim from being 
prejudiced; this is key to the McCoy decision. McCoy was awarded attorney fees because 
he complied with the law and his actions did not prejudice the ORS claim against the 
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third party. Here, unlike Mr. McCoy, the law firm failed to notify ORS of Streight's 
settlement for all available insurance proceeds. It was Jensen, Streight's father, who 
finally contacted the Office of Recovery Services, but only after the settlement had been 
approved and the proceeds paid into the supplemental needs trust (R. 362, 852). 
Here, the facts do not fall under any of the three recovery methods set out in 
McCoy. First, ORS was precluded from directly pursuing the third-party insurance 
company because it paid the insurance policy limits for a release of all claims before ORS 
or the Medicaid recipient put the third party on notice of the Medicaid claim (R.260, 851-
852). Second, Streight and the law firm never sought consent, so ORS never had the 
opportunity to grant consent and then later pay the law firm an attorney fee under a 
written agreement. Third, since Streight never sought consent, ORS never had the 
opportunity to deny consent and then choose to pursue reimbursement from the. recipient 
instead of the third party. In fact, four and Vi years after the settlement and at 
considerable expense in attorney fees paid by ORS to its own lawyers, Streight has still 
not paid the Medicaid lien out of the third-party settlement proceeds.l 
Additionally, McCoy did not overrule or criticize Camp v. Office of Recovery 
Services, 779 P.2d 242 (Utah App. 1989). The facts in the instant case are more 
1
 Unlike McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 5, and Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 119 
P.2d 242, 243 (Utah App. 1989), Streight did not place the settlement amount in a trust 
account in order to resolve the legal issues regarding the lien but instead quickly placed 
the funds in a supplemental needs trust in order to avoid satisfying the Medicaid lien (R. 
363). 
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analogous to the facts in Camp than to the facts in McCoy. In Camp, the Medicaid 
recipient, a daughter of Camp, was critically injured in a car accident and died six days 
later after incurring $39,000 in medical expenses. Camp applied for medical assistance to 
pay those expenses, but was denied because her application form did not contain the 
signature of a witness. Id. The following day, she retained counsel to file a claim for 
damages with the insurer. Id. at 244. The insurer verbally offered to settle for the policy 
limits. Id. One day later, Camp reapplied for medical assistance and was deemed 
eligible. Id. Medicaid then paid $15,018.41 in full satisfaction for her daughter's 
outstanding bills. Id. 
ORS learned of the proposed settlement and notified Camp's attorney of its claim. 
Id. Camp signed a settlement agreement, deposited the settlement check in a trust 
account and then commenced a declaratory action to determine her rights to the proceeds. 
Id. The trial court determined that Camp incurred $91,554 in special and general 
damages and that the Medicaid claim represented 16.5% of those damages, thus the State 
was entitled to 16.5% of the $20,000 settlement proceeds or $3,280. Id. The Utah Court 
of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that when the recipient proceeds against a 
third party without ORS consent, and the claim includes medical expenses, subsection 26-
19-7(2) applies. Id. at 246. The court also held that Camp was not entitled to an offset of 
the Medicaid lien for a contribution of fees under a version of subsection 7(4) which has 
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now been amended.2 
The court recognized "the legislative intent to prevent Medicaid recipients from 
obtaining double recovery." Id. If the recipient was not required to seek consent under 
section 26-19-7 in order to be awarded attorney fees, "recipients would be rewarded for 
proceeding in contravention of the statute." Id. at 247. This is exactly what happened in 
the instant case. Streight failed to seek or obtain consent from ORS and settled her claims 
for the entire policy limits and placed all available third-party proceeds into a 
supplemental needs trust without notice to ORS. 
In their brief, Streight and the Sykes law firm allege that ORS would 
systematically deny consent to Medicaid recipients and then intentionally refuse to pursue 
the claim because it was not equipped to handle the claims, wait for the recipient to settle, 
then step in and seek full reimbursement without paying an attorney fee (Aplt. Br: at 10-
11). Defendants do not specifically set forth why this disputed allegation would be an 
issue of material fact preventing summary judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). It 
simply seems to be an excuse why the recipient and law firm failed to seek the required 
consent. Defendants fail to provide any supporting case law excusing them from 
complying with the statutory requirements of section 26-19-7. 
2
 This version of section 26-19-7 allowed a payment of attorney fees only if an 
action had been commenced with the State's consent. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(1984) 
(amended 1989 and 1998). It was amended during the course of the Camp litigation. 
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Defendant's allegation is not only immaterial but is also untrue. During the 
months of December 1999 through February 2000, the three months preceding the McCoy 
decision, ORS entered into 43 collection/attorney fee agreements with Medicaid 
recipients. Of those 43 agreements, ORS obtained recovery on 27, with a net collection 
amount of $263,706.07 after paying out $126,732.59 in attorney fees (R. 754, Ex. G). 
During those same months, ORS collected $157,940.47 directly from liable third parties 
without any attorney involvement other than ORS's counsel in the Utah Attorney 
General's Office (R. 754, Ex. G). 
Streight settled for policy limits without notifying the third parties of the Medicaid 
claims, thereby effectively precluding ORS's claim against the third party. Practically 
speaking, there are no other insurance proceeds or policies from which ORS can recover. 
Unlike McCoy, Streight never put the third-party insurance companies on notice that 
Medicaid also had a claim against the proceeds. Now, ORS's only recourse is against 
Streight as the Medicaid recipient. ORS should not be required to contribute to attorney 
fees on claims not yet recovered and when it has been forced to incur attorney fees for its 
own lawyers in attempting to recover the proceeds that the Medicaid recipient unlawfully 
kept. 
3
 Although not cited in defendants' brief, the record includes two other affidavits 
apparently in support of this allegation (R. 679, 699). However, ORS submitted counter-
affidavits, including ORS policy that contradicted defendants' affidavits (R. 754 Ex. G 
and Ex. J). 
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Despite the defendants' attempt to rationalize their failure to obtain consent, their 
actions have prevented ORS from collection of its claim and have caused ORS to incur 
attorney fees in seeking to collect the same. To allow payment of the law firm's fees 
would encourage the Medicaid recipients to disregard section 26-19-7. It would 
effectively force ORS to contribute attorney fees to the Medicaid recipient rather than use 
its own resources to recover the claim even in cases where the only unresolved issues do 
not affect the Medicaid claim for reimbursement. 
Streight should not benefit from her own unlawful actions. If she had wanted a 
contribution of attorney fees, she was required to seek consent. McCoy provides 
guidance to a Medicaid recipient when ORS refuses consent. The law firm only needed 
to comply with section 26-19-7 and McCoy to protect its client and to be entitled to an 
attorney fee. It chose not to seek consent. At-the-very minimum, defendants could have 
and should have provided notice to ORS of the conservatorship petition and hearing to 
allow ORS to make a claim to the proceeds. Her own actions forced ORS to file a 
judicial action because she settled the case, deposited the funds into a supplemental needs 
trust and then refused to pay the Medicaid claim upon ORS's demand. 
III. STREIGHT'S NONCOOPERATION IN IDENTIFYING LIABLE 
THIRD PARTIES IS IMMATERIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANTS 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 26-19-7. 
Defendants' argue that the law firm is entitled to attorney fees because Streight 
cooperated with ORS by identifying liable third parties. However, Streight's cooperation 
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(or lack of it) is immaterial to the attorney fee issue because she and the law firm failed to 
comply with the requirements of section 26-19-7. Even if Streight's cooperation is a 
material fact, the trial court concluded that Streight's modest efforts did not amount to the 
level of cooperation required by 42 C.F.R. § 433.147 (1998) (R. 923). 
A state Medicaid agency must require a Medicaid recipient to cooperate in 
identifying and providing information to assist the agency in pursuing third parties 
responsible for paying for the Medicaid recipient's medical care. 42 C.F.R. § 
433.147(a)(2) (1998). Utah requires all Medicaid recipients to cooperate by providing 
information regarding third parties who may be liable for the recipient's medical 
expenses. Utah Admin. Code R527-800-8 and R527-936-2 (1997). A Medicaid recipient 
must also cooperate by paying to the agency proceeds that are covered by the assignment 
of rights. 42 C.F.R. § 433.147(b)(4) (1998). 
In McCoy, this Court specifically refrained from ruling on the issue of whether 
ORS must pay attorney fees to a recipient whose failure to cooperate prevents ORS from 
recovering from the third party. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 18 n. 4. The instant case is just 
that situation. McCoy emphasized that the Medicaid recipient has a duty to seek consent 
under section 26-19-7 and to cooperate with ORS in identifying and providing 
information to assist it in pursuing third parties under 42 C.F.R. § 433.147 (1998). Such 
cooperation keeps ORS informed and ensures that the State will not be prejudiced in its 
efforts to recover medical benefits. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 18 n.4. 
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The State is in a unique position in that its assigned claim is derived from an injury 
to the Medicaid recipient. Often the existence of a possible third party, the occurrence of 
an accident, or the location of the accident are known to the recipient, but not to ORS. 
Mr. McCoy failed to keep the State minimally informed. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 18 n.4. 
However, his lack of forthrightness did not prejudice the State's claim against the third 
party because he notified both ORS and the third party that he expressly excluded the 
Medicaid claim. Id. He also put the proceeds at issue in an attorney's client trust account 
until the litigation was resolved. Id. at f 5. 
In the instant case, Streight and her counsel failed to cooperate on both accounts. 
On June 26, 1998, Streight's father completed a Medicaid Third Party Insurance 
questionnaire identifying Sherilyn Christensen as the driver of the vehicle and incorrectly 
identifying the driver's insurance carrier as Farmers Insurance (R. 565, 850). Streight 
also incorrectly identified a possible third-party insurance carrier as Farmers Insurance in 
her application for assistance, including medical assistance on August 3rd, 1998 (R. 223, 
229). Finally, in her recertification for assistance form4 executed by Streight's mother 
and co-conservator Karen Jensen on September 14th, 1998, Streight identified "Ut State 
Farm" as the accident insurance with a notation that this insurer was paying for lost wages 
only (R. 238). 
4
 A recipient who wishes to continue her eligibility for assistance must renew it by 
completing and submitting a recertification form in the last month of the current 
eligibility period. 
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In that same recertification, Streight's mother revealed that she received $571 per 
month from Utah Farm Bureau, the correct insurer (R. 236), but failed to reveal the 
imminent settlement with Utah Farm Bureau and Ohio Casualty set out in the Petition for 
Conservatorship signed by Streight's attorney merely two days later (R.233-240,452-
459). Ohio Casualty was not mentioned on any documents submitted in Streight's public 
assistance application process. Although it may not be intentional and Streight's 
conservators were confused about the identity of any insurer, Streight failed to clearly 
identify the liable third-party information that was within her knowledge. 
More importantly, the applications and questionnaire were a part of Streight's 
Department of Workforce Services file along with her application for other assistance in 
addition to medical assistance (R. 578). ORS, the State agency designated to pursue 
reimbursement; had no knowledge of these documents until January 15,1999 (R. 578). 
Defendants argue that Streight cooperated by providing these documents to the 
Department of Workforce Services. However, plaintiff is not the Department of 
Workforce Services nor is Workforce Services the state agency that administers the Third 
Party Liability program on behalf of the Department of Health. ORS, not the Department 
of Workforce Services, has adopted the federal requirements regarding a Medicaid 
recipient's cooperation. Utah Admin. Code R527-936-2 (1997). 
Streight also failed to comply with the cooperation requirement in 42 C.F.R. § 
433.147(b)(4) by not paying to the agency (ORS) any support or medical funds that she 
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received from the liable third party or segregate the funds into a safe place until the issue 
was resolved. Currently, there are no remaining proceeds. All the proceeds were used to 
buy a house, in which Streight no longer lives, and seven acres of land (R. 640). 
Even though Streight and her conservators may not know the difference between 
ORS and the Department of Workforce Services, her legal counsel would know the 
difference between governmental agencies when one of those agencies is specifically 
identified in a governing statute or rule. Both the cooperation rules and the consent 
statute do not contain any ambiguous language and the agencies involved with these rules 
and statutes are clearly identified. See Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109, 
f 14, 37 P.3d 1156 (where statute is clear, readily available and accessible to counsel, 
strict compliance of notice provision is required). 
Streight's incomplete cooperation and her failure to comply with section 26-19-7 
prejudiced ORS's ability to choose its method of recovery. Despite ORS's statutory 
priority Medicaid lien on all third-party proceeds, Streight's petition for settlement 
submitted through her counsel, co-defendant law firm, clearly and succinctly stated that 
"[t]here are no other persons interested in Peggy Sue's estate who are entitled to notice 
pursuant to law, other than the natural parents and guardians, Bud and Karen Jensen" (R. 
452). This was incorrect. Both ORS and the Department of Health had a clearly 
identifiable interest in any third party proceeds paid to Streight's estate and were entitled 
to notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-405(2) and 75-5-406. 
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The Medicaid recipient cannot engage in a race to the courthouse in order to obtain 
all available settlement proceeds without providing any information to ORS or seeking 
consent, then claim that it was ORS's own lack of action that prejudiced the Medicaid 
claim and not the recipient's less than forthright acts surrounding the settlement of her 
own claim against the third party. Even if ORS had been given the correct information, 
as required, the statute of limitations to proceed on the Medicaid lien is four years from 
the date of the accident or six months from the lastpayment of assistance. Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-19-8(l)(b). Once ORS identified the liable third party in January, 1999, it still 
had over three years to investigate the facts surrounding the accident and submit its claim 
to the third party. 
Under the Medical Benefits Recovery Act governing the Third Party Liability 
program, the Medicaid recipient must obtain the consent of ORS even before filing a 
claim with the third party. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(1 )(a) (1998). A forthright 
Medicaid recipient would, upon knowledge of a possible claim contact ORS as soon as 
possible, identify the third party and seek consent to include the Medicaid claim in with 
her claim. ORS would then need to make a decision. Under subsection 26-19-7(4), it 
could choose to offer written consent to the recipient or investigate the case and pursue its 
own claim. There are going to be many instances where ORS may choose to pursue its 
own claim. For example, if from the beginning of the case, the liability of the third party 
is clear and the third party is willing to reimburse Medicaid for medical expenses, ORS 
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would have no need to pay an attorney fee to a recipient who is litigating issues 
surrounding compensable damages for pain and suffering or future damages. ORS would 
receive no benefit from that litigation. 
In another example, the Medicaid recipient could wait until the eve of settlement to 
contact ORS to identify a possible liable third party or to seek consent, again preventing 
ORS from choosing to investigate and pursue its own claim. Such actions would violate 
subsection 26-19-7(4), which requires the recipient to seek consent even before filing a 
claim with the third party. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(l)(a). The Medical Benefits 
Recovery Act was established to require that from the moment the Medicaid recipient has 
information and knowledge about a possible third party, she must notify ORS so that ORS 
may make an informed choice as to its method of recovery of reimbursement. 
In yet another example, the Medicaid recipient could wait until the eve of 
settlement before contacting ORS or providing the identifying third-party information and 
then demand that if ORS did not reduce or waive its lien, the recipient would not settle 
with the third party or would not forward the lien amount to ORS. ORS should not be 
required to consent to representation by counsel who have made it clear they consider the 
very existence of the ORS lien to be unlawful or is willing to hold up settlement in order 
to coerce ORS into reducing the lien amount. ORS would be at a disadvantage if it were 
required to be bound by the Medicaid recipient's choice of counsel or was not allowed to 
investigate and pursue recovery on its own. 
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In sum, federal regulations require that the Medicaid recipient cooperate with ORS 
by providing information identifying liable third parties and by forwarding to ORS third-
party proceeds that legally belong to the State. Streight's and the Sykes law firm's failure 
to comply with this requirement has cost the State and the taxpayer-funded assistance 
program both its right to pursue the third party directly and the cost of paying its own 
attorney fees to seek payment of the lien from the funds already in her hands. She should 
not additionally be rewarded by requiring ORS to contribute attorney fees towards her 
unlawful acts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ORS respectfully requests that the Court affirm the 
summary judgment in its favor. 
y\d 
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MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT 26-19-5 
(b) The assignment 
(1) authorizes the department to submit its claim to the third party 
and authorizes payment of benefits directly to the department, and 
(n) is effective for all medical assistance 
(2) The department may recover the assigned benefits or payments in 
accordance with Section 26-19-5 and as otherwise provided by law 
(3) The assignment of benefits includes medical support and third party 
payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged bv any court of this state or any other 
state or territory of the United States That assignment is not m lieu of, and 
does not supersede or alter anv other court order, decree, or judgment 
(4) When an assignment takes effect, the recipient is entitled to receive 
medical assistance, and the benefits paid to the department are a reimburse-
ment to the department 
History: C. 1953, 26-19-4.5, enacted by L. thereafter and added the language beginning 
1993, ch. 145, § 2; 1998, ch. 145, § 2. 'regardless of who* at the end, and substituted 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend aall medical assistance" for "services that are 
ment, effective Mav 4 1998 divided Subsection paid or to be paid by the department under the 
(1), making stylistic changes throughout in state plan, Section 26-18-10, and Title XIX of 
Subsection (l)(a) deleted "deemed to be" before the federal Social Security Act" in Subsection 
"assigned" and inserted "bv operation ot law" (D(bXii) 
26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third party 
— Lien — Notice — Action — Compromise or 
waiver — Recipient's right to action protected. 
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated to provide 
medical assistance to a recipient because of an injury, disease, or disability 
that a third party is obligated to pay for, the department may recover the 
medical assistance directly from that third party. 
(b) The department's claim to recover medical assistance provided as a 
result of the injury, disease, or disability is a hen against any proceeds 
payable to or on behalf of the recipient by that third party. This hen has 
priority over all other claims to the proceeds, except claims for attorney's 
fees and costs authorized under Subsection 26-19-7(4) 
(2) The department shall mail or deliver written notice of its hen to the third 
party at its principal place of business or last known address. The notice shall 
include the recipient's name, the approximate date of injury, a general 
description of the type of injury and, if applicable, the general location where 
the injury is alleged to have occurred 
(3) The department may commence an action on its lien m its own name, but 
that hen is not enforceable as to a third party unless: 
(a) the third party receives written notice of the department's hen 
before it settles with the recipient; or 
(b) the department has evidence that the third party had knowledge 
that the department provided or was obligated to provide medical assis-
tance. 
(4) The department may waive a claim against a third party m whole or in 
part, or may compromise, settle, or release a claim or hen. 
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an action by a 
recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or damage not included in the 
department's action 
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26-19-6 HEALTH CODE 
(6) The department's lien on proceeds under this section is not affected by 
the transfer of the proceeds to a trust, account, or other financial instrument. 
History: C. 1953, 26-19-5, enacted by L. ment, effective Mav 1,1995, subdivided Subsec-
1984, ch. 34. & 3; 1989, ch. 163, § 2; 1995, ch. tion (1), inserted "or on Dehalf oF in Subsection 
102, § 2; 1998, ch. 145, § 3. (1Kb), and made stylistic changes throughout 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws the section. 
1984, ch. 34. $ 3 repealed former $ 26-19-5 (L. The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, 
1981, ch. 126, § 18), relating to an action by the
 m Subsection (l)(a) substituted "obligated to 
department against a third party or earner, pay for" for "liable" and made a styhstic change, 
and enacted present § 26-19-5
 and a d d e d Subsection (6). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability. third party is liable. Utah Dep't of Social Servs. 
This section authonzes the state to recover v. Higley, 810 P.2d 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
the medical assistance it has provided when a 
26-19-6. Action by department — Notice to recipient. 
(1) Within 30 days after commencing an action under Section 26-19-5, the 
department shall give the recipient, his guardian, personal representative, 
estate, or survivor, whichever is appropriate, written notice of the action by 
personal service or certified mail to the last known address of the person 
receiving the notice. Proof of service shall be filed in the action. The recipient 
may intervene in the department's action at any time before trial. 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall name the court in which the 
action is commenced and advise the recipient of his right to intervene in the 
proceeding, his right to obtain a private attorney, and the department's right to 
recover medical assistance directly from the third party. 
History: C. 1953, 26-19-6, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 18; 1984, ch. 34, § 4; 1985, 
ch. 21, § 10. 
26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient — Consent of de-
partment required — Department's right to in-
tervene — Department's interests protected — 
Attorney's fees and costs. 
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle, 
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of 
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the department 
has provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance, 
without the department's written consent. 
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action 
commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected with the 
same injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or has become 
obligated to provide medical assistance. 
(2) (a) If the recipient proceeds without the department's written consent as 
required by Subsection ll)(a), the department is not bound by any 
decision, judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the 
claim or in the action. 
204 
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT 26-19-8 
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party 
to which the proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it 
has provided and retains its right to commence an independent action 
against the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3). 
(3) The departments written consent, if given, shall state under what terms 
,he interests of the department may be represented in an action commenced by 
,he recipient. 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for 
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action 
that is commenced with the departments written consent. 
History: C. 1953, 26-19-7, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 34, § 5; 1989, ch. 163, § 2; 1995, ch. 
102, § 3. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1984, ch. 34, § 5 repealed former § 26-19-7 (L 
1981, ch. 126, § 18), relating to notice of an 
action by the department against a third party 
or earner, and enacted present § 26-19-7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added the subdi-
vision designations in Subsection (2) and in-
serted "or any party to which the proceeds were 
made payable" in Subsection (2Kb) 




—Costs and attorney fees. 
—Proceeding against third party. 
Retroactive application. 
The 1989 amendment of this section was 
intended to clarify the statute m order to en-
compass all claims resolutions. The amend-
ment was not substantive, and can be applied 
retroactively. Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v 
Higley, 810 P.2d 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
State consent. 
—Costs and attorney fees. 
The commencement of an action without 
state consent would rule out a state contribu-
tion for costs and attorney fees Camp v Office 
of Recovery Servs., 779 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) 
Although Subsection (4) may authorize an 
award of attorney fees to some Medicaid recipi-
ents, the fees must be m connection with the 
commencement of an action, and the action 
must be commenced with the state's written 
consent. Camp v. Office of Recovery Servs., 779 
P2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Proceeding against third party. 
The state is entitled to full, rather than 
equitable, reimbursement from a recipient for 
all its Medicaid expenditures when the recipi-
ent proceeds against a third party without the 
state's consent. Camp v. Office of Recovery 
Servs , 779 R2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
26-19-8. Statute of limitations — Survival of right of 
action — Insurance policy not to limit time al-
lowed for recovery. 
(1) (a) An action commenced by the department under this chapter against 
a health insurance carrier or employee welfare benefit plan must be 
commenced within two years after the date of the injury or onset of the 
illness or within six months after the date of the last payment for medical 
assistance, whichever is later. 
(b) An action against any other third party must be commenced within 
four years after the date of the injury or onset of the illness, or within six 
months after the date of the last payment for medical assistance, which-
ever is later. 
(2) The death of the recipient does not abate any right of action established 
by this chapter. 
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R527-253-1 (10/97) HTTMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 250 
tiai for obtaining" meaicai support based on the following 
criteria: 
1. the obligated parent is employed bv an employer 
where health insurance is available throuen the employer 
at a reasonaole cost, or 
2. the ooiigated parent belongs to a group ifor example, a 
union or professional organization) where group health 
insurance is available to members of the group at a 
reasonaole cost, and 
3. ail of the following conditions are present: 
a. the children are not presently enrolled in an adequate 
health insurance plan, 
b. there is a probability that employment or group 
membership will last long enough that coverage will sig-
nificantly help meet the chiid(ren/s medical or dental 
needs, 
c. the child support order is a judicial order, 
d. the obligated parent is currently paying the child 
support amount as ordered, 
e. it is probable that the medical insurance would benefit 
the child(ren), and 
f. in a Non-AFDC Non-Medicaid case, the obligee has 
consented to the attempt to modify the court order. 
References: 62A-11-326, 78-45-7.1. 
History; 10430, NEW. 02/01/90; 13102, AMD. 09/02/92; 
15462, AMD, 03/22/94; 17503, AMD, 02/22/96; 18355, 5YR, 
12/09/96; 18575, AMD, 03/18/97. 
R527-263. Collection of Child Support Judgments. 
R527-253-1. Collection of Child Support Judgments. 
R527-253-1. Collection of Child Support Judgments. 
1. The office may demand and collect immediate pay-
ment in full, or may demand and collect payments that will 
result in payment in full within a period of time that is 
deemed to meet the interests of the state in child support 
judgment matters. 
2. The office may set or reset a schedule of payments to 
pay a child support judgment that is equal to 50% of the 
current support award to meet the requirement of Section 
62A-ll-32(XlXa). 
3. The office may collect a child support judgment 
through income withholding, liens, tax refund intercepts, 
and any other legal remedy available. Initiation of a 
particular remedy shall not limit the office from initiating 
any other remedy at the same time. 
References: 62A-11-320. 
History: 13175, AMD, 09/14/92; 18948, 5YR, 04/16797; 
18944, AMD, 06704/97. 
R627-255. Change in Circumstances. 
R527-255-1. Change in Circumstances. 
R527-255-1. Change in Circumstances. 
1. If the change in circumstances is temporary; defined as 
less than 6 months in prospective duration, the current 
support order shall not be modified. 
2. If the change in circumstances is more extended, 
defined as 6 to 12 months in prospective duration, the office 
has the discretion to determine whether the change IB 
minimal such that the original order should not be ad-
justed, or significant enough to justify initiating proceed-
ings to adjust the award pursuant to Sections 78-45-7.2 
through 78-45-7.21. 
3. If the change m circumstances is long term or perma-
nent, denned as over 12 months in prospective duration, 
:he office snail initiate proceedings to adjust the award 
pursuant to Sections 78-45-7.2 througn 78-45-7.21. 
References: 78-45-7 through 78-45-7.21, 62A-11-320.5, 
62A-11-320.6. 
History: 13171, AMD, 09/14/92; 19531, AMD, 08715797. 
R527-337. Repealed. 
History: 18678, REP. 04/08/97. 
R527-475. State Tax Refund Intercept. 
R527-475-1. State Tax Refund Intercept. 
R527-475-1. State Tax Refund Intercept. 
1. Pursuant to Section 59-10-529(1), the Office of Recov-
ery Services may intercept a state tax refund to recover 
delinquent child support. For a state tax refund to be 
intercepted, there must be an administrative or judicial 
judgment with a balance owing. An installment of child 
support is considered a judgment for purposes of Section 
59-10-529 on and after the date it becomes due as provided 
in Section 30-3-10.6. 
2. State tax refunds intercepted will be applied to satisfy 
obligations owed to the state and collected by the Office of 
Recovery Services before any of the funds are applied to 
Non-AFDC arrearages. In accordance with 45 CFR 
303.102, Non-AFDC obligees must be notified upon appli-
cation for child support services that state tax reninds 
intercepted will not be applied to arrearages owed to thai 
obligee until all obligations owed to the state and ^Ijerted 
by the Office of Recovery Services have been paid in fulL 
3. The Office of Recovery Services shall notary the ontifsr 
and the unobligated spouse that the state tax refund has 
been received by the Office. The notice shall advsw the 
unobligated spouse of his right to receive a portion of the 
tax refund if the unobligated spouse had earnings and filed 
jointly with the obligor. If the unobligated spouse does not 
want his share of the tax refund to be applied to the 
obligated spouse's child support debt, the unobligated 
spouse shall make a written request and submit a copy of 
the tax return and W-2*s to the office within 25 days of the 
date the office sends the notice. The unobligated spouse's 
portion of the joint tax refund will be prorated according to 
the percentage of income reported on the W-2 forma for the 
tax year. If the unobligated spouse does not make a written 
request to the office to obtain his share of the tax refund 
within the specified time -limit, the office shall not be 
required to pay any portion of the tax refund to the 
unobligated spouse. 
References: 59-10-529, 30-3-10.6. 
History: 10521, AMD, 03/20/90; 10690, NSC, 04/26/90; 
16951, 5YR, 06715795; 18589, AMD, 03/19/97. 
R527-800. Enforcement Procedures. 
R527-800-1. Purpose and Authority. 
R527-800-2. Credit of Tax Refund. 
R527-800-3. Garnishment of Wages. 
R527-800-4. Acquisition and Disposition of Real Property. 
R527-800-5. Sale of Real Property. 
R527-800-6. Liens, Cost of Sale. 
R527-800-7. Sanctions, Retained Support. 
R527-800-8. Sanction, Medical Support, TPL, Paternity. 
R527-800-1. Purpose and Authority. 
A. Purpose 
Enforcement *rtiftns may be initiated when: 
1. Tne obligor has agreed. 
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2. The obligor is entitled to a federal or state income tax 
refund which may be applied to certain debts under specinc 
Federal and State statute. 
3. The obligor has failed to make payments on the debt 
and the agency has information regarding the obligor's 
income and/or assets. 
B. Authority 
Section 62A-11-104 charges the Office of Recovery Ser-
vices with the duty to collect money due the department. 
Enforcement actions snail be initiated m accordance with 
the specific statutory authority provided under specinc 
state statute and in accordance with the Criminal Code, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Uniform Probate Code and 
the Judicial Code Utah Code Annotated. 
R527-800-2. Credit of Tax Refund. 
The office may credit an overpayment of taxes toward a 
judgment owed to the state, in accordance with Section 
59-10-529. 
R527-80O-3. Garnishment of Wages. 
The department may garnish wages in accordance with 
Rule 64D, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
R527-800-4. Acquisition and Disposition of Real 
Property. 
A The department may acquire property in payment for 
an obligation by: 
1. voluntary conveyance. 
2. conveyance by heirs; or 
3. execution. 
B. Acquisition of real property is an action of last resort. 
C. Voluntary conveyance shall be by Warranty or Quit 
Claim Deed in favor of the department. 
D. Property owned by the state is tax exempt in accor-
dance with Section 59-2-1101. 
R527-80O-5. Sale of Real Property. 
A, Certified appraisals and preliminary title reporta may 
be requested. 
B. The department will not provide title insurance. The 
State will clear all back taxes and encumbrances from the 
property at the time of closing. 
R527-800-6. Liana, Coat of Sale. 
The costs of sale which are allowed are those provided in 
62A-11-111. 
R527-800-7. HaiMTtiona, Retained Support. 
In accordance with 45 CFR 232.12(d), if a recipient 
incurred a Retained Support obligation and mils to either 
make an agreement to pay the debt or makes an agreement 
and defaults, a sanction for non-cooperation must be im-
posed if the obligor is currently receiving AFDC. 
R527-80O-8. Sanction, Medical Support, TPL, Pater-
nity. 
In accordance with 42 CFR 433.147-148 a recipient of 
medical assistance must cooperate with the state agency in 
providing information regarding Third Party Liability, 
establishment of paternity for children to ntaMish medical 
support liability, and in utilizing all available third party 
resources to offset medicaid expenditures. Failure to coop-
erate will result in the recipient being removed from the 
medical assistance case. 
References: 62A-1M11, 62A-9-130, 62A-9-131, 62A-11-
104, 62A-1M10. 
History: 12110, AMD, 10/31/91; 12111, AMD, 10/31/91; 
12112, NSC, 10/15791; 12113, NSC, 10/15791; 18109, 5YR, 
09/24/96; 18110, AMD, 11/16796: 18277, NSC, 05/19/97. 
R527-936. Third Party Liability, Medicaid. 
R527-936-1. Definition and Purpose. 
R527-936-2. Authority. 
R527-936-3. Assignment of Benefits. 
R527-936-4. Cooperation as a Condition of Eligibility. 
R527-936-5. Payor of Last Resort. 
R527-936-1. Definition and Purpose. 
A third party is any individual, entity, or program that is 
or may be liable to pay all or part of the medical cost of 
injury, disease or disability of a Medicaid recipient. Tne 
Utah Third Party Liability Program has been —t-Mf**™*4 
to assure that all private medical resources have been 
exhausted before a claim is paid by Medicaid; or that when 
the agency discovers a liable third party after payment of a 
claim, reimbursement is sought. 
R527-936-2. Authority. 
Federal Regulations 42 CFR 433.135 through 433.154 
a Third Party liability Program, and specify the require-
ments for a state plan concerning Third Party Liability. 
The office adopts these sections and incorporates thssn by 
reference. Sections 26-19-1 through 26-19-18 aiilhsaiui a 
Third Party Liability Medicaid Recovery 
establish the legal liabilities of third parties audi 
R827-936-3. Assignment of Benefits. 
Federal regulations 42 CFR 433.145 and 433.146 apecify 
the applicant/recipient responsibility to assign their righto 
to third party payments as a condition of eligibility; 
R827-9364. Cooperation aa a Conation of nUa^bOity. 
The applicant/recipient must cooperate in estssnmhing 
paternity and obtaining medical support and other third 
party payments as spooned in 42 CFR 433.147. Office of 
Recovery Services will initiate sanctions for i 
tion in accordance with the Federal regulations i 
procedures. 
RS27-&3M. Payor of Last 
Medicaid shall be the payor of last resort aa specated m 
42 CFR 433.138, 42 CFR 433.139, and Subsection 26-18-
10(4). 
Reference*: 28-19-1 through 18, 26-18-8,28-18-10(4). 
History: 12124, NSC, 10/15/91; 12125, NSC* 1Q05V91; 
12126, NSC, 10/15/91; 12158. AMD, 12/06791; 18148,5YR, 
lQffll/96; 18146, AMD, 11/16796. 
42 CFR§ 433.147 
42 C.F.R. § 433.147 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
TITLE 42 -PUBLIC HEALTH 
CHAPTER IV-HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES 
SUBCHAPTER C-MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
PART 433-STATE FISCAL ADMINISTRATION 
SUBPART D--THIRD PARTY LIABILITY 
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS TO BENEFITS 
§ 433.147 Cooperation in establishing paternity and in obtaining medical support and payments and 
in identifying and providing information to assist in pursuing third parties who may be liable to pay. 
(a) Scope of requirement. The agency must require the individual who assigns his or her rights to 
cooperate in~ 
(1) Establishing paternity of a child born out of wedlock and obtaining medical support and 
payments for himself or herself and any other person for whom the individual can legally assign 
rights, except that individuals described in section 1902(1)(1)(A) of the Act (poverty level pregnant 
women) are exempt from these requirements involving paternity and obtaining medical support and 
payments from, or derived from, the father of the child born out of wedlock; and 
(2) Identifying and providing information to assist the Medicaid agency in pursuing third parties who 
may be liable to pay for care and services under the plan. 
(b) Essentials of cooperation. As part of a cooperation, the agency may require an individual to— 
(1) Appear at a State or local office designated by the agency to provide information or evidence 
relevant to the case; 
(2) Appear as a witness at a court or other proceeding; 
(3) Provide information, or attest to lack of information, under penalty of perjury; 
(4) Pay to the agency any support or medical care funds received that are covered by the assignment 
of rights; and 
(5) Take any other reasonable steps to assist in establishing paternity and securing medical support 
and payments, and in identifying and providing information to assist the State in pursuing any liable 
third party. 
(c) Waiver of cooperation for good cause. The agency must waive the requirements in paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of this section if it determines that the individual has good cause for refusing to cooperate. 
(1) With respect to establishing paternity of a child born out of wedlock or obtaining medical care 
support and payments, or identifying or providing information to assist the State in pursuing any 
liable third party for a child for whom the individual can legally assign rights, the agency must find 
the cooperation is against the best interests of the child, in accordance with factors specified for the 
Child Support Enforcement Program at 45 CFR part 232. If the State title F/-A agency has made a 
finding that good cause for refusal to cooperate does or does not exist, the Medicaid agency must 
adopt that finding as its own for this purpose. 
(2) With respect to obtaining medical care support and payments for an individual and identifying 
and providing information to assist in pursuing liable third parties in any case not covered by 
paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the agency must find that cooperation is against the best interests 
of the individual or the person to whom Medicaid is being furnished because it is anticipated that 
cooperation will result in reprisal against, and cause physical or emotional harm to, the individual 
or other person. 
(d) Procedures for waiving cooperation. With respect to establishing paternity, obtaining medical 
care support and payments, or identifying and providing information to assist the State in pursuing 
liable third parties for a child for whom the individual can legally assign rights, the agency must use 
the procedures specified for the Child Support Enforcement Program at 45 CFR part 232. With 
respect to obtaining medical care support and payments or to identifying and providing information 
to assist the State in pursuing liable third parties for any other individual, the agency must adopt 
procedures similar to those specified in 45 CFR part 232, excluding those procedures applicable only 
to children. 
[55 FR 48606, Nov. 21, 1990; 58 FR 4907. Jan. 19, 1993] 
42 C. F. R. § 433.147 
42 CFR § 433.147 
END OF DOCUMENT 
